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time of his death, was valued at approximately $750,000. Inventories were med
showing $425,000 in real property, $2,500
in tangible personal property and $324,000
in intangible personal property including
stocks, bonds and bank accounts.
Miriam E. Emmert was the designated
personal representative of her father's
estate. In this capacity, she filed a petition
for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court
for Carroll County. The petition alleged,
among other things, that the phrase "personal property was ambiguous; that the
testator's intention was to include only
tangible personal property ... " Emmert '0.
Hearn, 309 Md. at 21, 522 A.2d 377.
The trial court concluded that a latent
ambiguity existed as to whether the "personal property" referred to in the second
provision of Roberts' will included tangible, as well as intangible, personal property. Extrinsic evidence, including testimony
by Emmert, one of the testator's children,
and the deposition by the attorney who
drafted the will, was admitted to "clear the
ambiguity." Id. at 22, 522 A.2d at 379.
From this testimony, it was gleaned that
the intention of the testator was to include
only tangible personal property in his
second provision. The court held that the
words "personal property," as used in the
second provision of his will, applied to tangible property only, and that the intangible personal property passed under
another provision of the will into the inter
vivos trust.
In an unreported opinion, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the
circuit court judgment. It found that no
ambiguity existed as to the words of the
will; therefore, extrinsic evidence as to the
intention of the testator should not have
been permitted. According to the court of
special appeals, the trial court was in error
in admitting extrinsic evidence of the testator's intention. Certiorari was granted by
the court of appeals to consider the important question presented 307 Md. 163
(1986).
Upon review, the court of appeals
applied a step-by-step analysis in construing the will. Ordinarily, the court said, the
intent of a testator must be gathered from
the four corners of the will, giving words
their "plain meaning." In so doing, the
court recognized that their foremost concern was to ascertain the testator's expressed intent. However, the court stressed that
"[e]xtrinsic evidence should not be admitted to show that the testator meant something different from what his language
imports .. , What he meant to say must be
gathered from what he did say." Id. (quoting Fersinger '0. Martin, 183 Md. 135, 138,
36 A.2d 716 (1944».

The court then looked to Webster's Dictionary, as well as Black's Law Dictionary,
to determine both the ordinary and the
legal meaning of the term "personal property." Both sources included intangible
property in their definitions. Additionally,
the court noted that bequests of personal
property are generally to be construed
broadly unless there is some indication in
the will to the contrary. The court cited
several cases where it had applied this general rule.
In Leroy '0. Kirk, 262 Md. 276, 283, 277
A.2d 611 (1971), for example, the testator
bequeathed "all of my personal property,
including my automobile, boat and the
contents of my house and outbuildings .... " The listing of items put a restriction on the term "personal property" and
caused the court to limit, by example, the
bequest to tangible personal property.
Returning to the Roberts' will, the court
found that nothing on the face of the will
limited or qualified the bequest of personal
property. No examples were given in the
will for the purpose of illustration as to
what the testator meant by personal property. The court concluded that the will
was unambiguous on its face. Furthermore, the court stated that a latent ambiguity did not exist in the provisions of the
Roberts' will. H "the language of the will
is plain and single, yet is found to apply
equally to two or more subjct or objects
then it would indicate latent ambiguity."
Emmert, 309 Md. at 27,522 A.2d 377, 381.
Extrinsic evidence would be admissible
only to resolve an ambiguity. Id. Such
extrinsic evidence might also indicate that
the description in the will is defective.
The court stated that there was no defective description in the will nor was there
any indication that Roberts' bequest
applied to two or more persons or things.
Thus, "if the language of a will is clear
and no latent ambiguity exists, the court's
role in the construction of the will is at an
end." Id. at 28, 522 A.2d at 382. There
being no indication that the testator
intended anything other than all of his personal property to pass under the second
provision, the court held that the bequest
in that paragraph was all-inclusive.
The court cautioned that its holding
would yield an unfair result to the grandchildren, especially to the son of the
deceased child, but such "[A]n inequality
cannot influence a court in its duty to find
out what a testator meant by his will.... "
Emmert, 309 Md. at 28, 522 A.2d 377
. (quoting McCurdy '0. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 190 Md. 67, 69, 57 A.2d 302, 303
(1948».
By its holding the court has once more
underscored the important of specificity in

the drafting of legal documents. Drafters
of wills and other testamentary devices
will take note to be as specific as possible
in putting into words the true intentions of
their clients.

- )fargaret Ann Willis

Allstate Insurance Company
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Atwood:

INSURER BOUND BY VERDICT IN
TORT ACTION AND COULD NOT
RELITIGATE SAME ISSUES AND
OBTAIN AN OVERRIDING
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON
JURY'S VERDICT
In Allstate Ins. Co. '0. Atwood, 71 Md.
App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066 (1987), the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that a
tort-feasor's insurer, which provided
defense for the tort-feasor in an action
brought by the victim, in which the jury
determined that the defendant's striking of
the victim was the result of negligence
rather than battery, was bound by the verdict even though it was not a party to the
suit. As a result, the insurer could not seek
post verdict declaratory relief on the same
issues of fact which has been decided in the
tort-feasor's trial.
This case stems from an incident which
occured in 1983. In an apparently
unprovoked attack, the insured, John
Atwood, struck another youth in the face.
The suit was brought by the victim, individually and through his father, against
Atwood in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The complaint alleged
that the plaintiff's injuries were the result
of either Atwood's negligence or intentional assault and battery.
Atwood, who was living with his
parents at the time of the incident, relied
on their policy with Allstate Insurance
Company. The exclusionary clause pr<r
vided that the insurer is not liable for
"bodily injury ... intentionally caused by
an insured person." Id. at 108, 523 A.2d at
1067.
Before the trial, believing Atwood's
striking of the victim was intentional and
thereby excluded from coverage, Allstate
filed for declaratory relief in 1984. The Bill
was dismissed on the grounds that it was
premature.
At the trial, the jury found that Atwood
was negligent which prevented the defendant's conduct from coming within the
policy's exclusion regarding intentional
conduct. Despite the jury's finding of
negligence, Allstate filed for a Bill of
Declaratory Relief on the ground that the
. injuries sustained by the plaintiff "were a
direct result ... of (Atwood's) intentional
Fal~
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act." Id. After both parties successfully had
the motion dismissed, Allstate appealed.
Writing for the majority in the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, Chief Judge
Gilbert found the vexing issue presented
by this case to be: "whether an insurer
may. .. after disposition of the tort matter, relitigate the same issues and obtain a
declaratory judgment... that overrides
the jury's verdict on the tort action." Id.
The court found that even though Allstate
was not a party to the tort action, it is nevertheless bound by the jury's verdict.
The court cited Brohawn 'Cl. Tran·
samerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d
854 (1975) as being similar with respect to
the conflict between an insurer and an
insured. The conflict in Brohawn arose out
of a complaint that alleged separate and
alternative theories of negligence and
assault and battery. The insurer insisted
because of the conflicting legal theories
averred against its insured, the extent of
policy coverage (due to an exclusionary
clause similar to the case here) should be
resolved prior to trial in a declaratory
action. Although the Brohawn court
noted, as did the court here, that the above
contention is not without merit, it held
that a declaratory action is inappropriate
where the questions of fact to be resolved
in the declaratory action are also to be litigated in the pending action. Id.
The court, in its application of Brohawn,
found that while an insurer's right to preliminary adjudication on an insured's right
to coverage under an insurance policy is
limited, it is not a compelling enough
reason to allow an insurer to adjudicate
issues that will be subsequently litigated at
trial. Allstate, 71 Md. App. at 1069, 523
A2d. at 1069.
The court further pointed out that
Brohawn as applied did not strip away all
of Allstate's defenses. To begin, the court
refused to read Brohawn as a bar to an
insurance carrier's ability to be a party to
the action. Nothing in the cited authority
forbids the carrier, after supplying independent counsel to its insured or paying
the cost of the insured's choice of counsel,
from intervening as a party and from being
represented at a tort trial.
Thus, to limit the more severe implications of this holding, the court placed the
locus of the blame on Allstate for its failure to intervene, not on Allstate being
denied its right to representation.
The court in AtUlood clearly indicates
that a more affirmative role should be
played by the insurance carrier in tort litigation in which a plaintiff pleads alternative legal theories of which one will be
excluded by the scope of the policy at trial.
Implicitly the court held firm in its unwil
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lingness to compromise a jury verdict on
an issue of liability, despite the fact that
extrinsic evidence may reveal that the
jury's finding may well fall into an
insurance carrier's exclusionary' provision.

.-Michael T. Wyatt
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